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FIDUCIARY INCONGRUITY: OPEN QUESTIONS ARISING
FROM ASCRIBING IDENTICAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO
CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Darren C. Skinner*
INTRODUCTION
In the 2009 decision of Gantler v. Stephens,1 the Delaware Supreme Court
confirmed, in what it described as a “matter of first impression” for the court,
that non-director corporate officers2 owe to their corporations fiduciary duties
that are “identical to those of directors.”3 As discussed below, there are
important unanswered questions regarding this aspect of the opinion in light of
the practical realities of the corporate governance role of a corporate officer.
After a summary of the relevant aspects of the Gantler decision, this article
will suggest and discuss a few of these open questions.
A. The Gantler Decision
Gantler involved a breach of fiduciary duty action in which the plaintiffs,
who were certain shareholders of First Niles Financial, Inc. (“First Niles”),
filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery asserting that the defendants, who
were officers and directors of First Niles, violated their fiduciary duties by
(i) rejecting a valuable opportunity to sell the company, (ii) deciding instead to
reclassify the company’s shares in order to benefit themselves, and
(iii) disseminating a materially misleading proxy statement to induce
shareholder approval.4 The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit,
essentially arguing that the claims were legally deficient for failure to allege
facts sufficient to overcome the business judgment presumption and because

* Darren C. Skinner is a Partner in the corporate and securities practice group at Arnold & Porter LLP
(www.arnoldporter.com), resident in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office. This article is intended to inform the
reader of certain general legal principles. It does not provide, and should not be construed as, legal advice
regarding specific problems or circumstances.
1 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
2 Unless otherwise indicated, references in this article to “officers” are intended to refer to non-director
officers (i.e., officers who are not also directors of their respective corporations). Similarly, references herein
to “directors” are intended to refer to directors who are not also officers of their corporations.
3 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 708.
4 Id. at 699.
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the First Niles shareholders had “ratified” the Board’s decision to reclassify the
First Niles shares.5 The Court of Chancery agreed with these arguments and
dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed to the Delaware Supreme
Court.6
The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Court of Chancery’s
judgment in its entirety and remanded the proceedings.7 Significantly, in
addressing the claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the
First Niles shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
That issue—whether or not officers owe fiduciary duties identical to
those of directors—has been characterized as a matter of first
impression for this Court. In the past, we have implied that officers of
Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as
those of directors. We now explicitly so hold. The only question
presented here is whether the complaint alleges sufficiently detailed
acts of wrongdoing by [Management] to state a claim that they
8
breached their fiduciary duties as officers. We conclude that it does.

As discussed below, the doctrine that corporate officers owe fiduciary
duties to their corporations identical to those owed by directorswhich
doctrine is referred to herein as “fiduciary duty equivalency”can lead to
potentially confounding and disharmonious outcomes.
B. Who Qualifies as an Officer for Purposes of Fiduciary Duty Equivalency?
Applying fiduciary duty equivalency in an effective manner necessarily
requires a definition—or at least some common understanding—of who is (and
is not) a corporate officer. Certainly, an individual’s tenure as an employee
(even a senior employee) of a corporation, does not, without more, mean that
he or she is an “officer” of the corporation.9 Delaware’s General Corporation
Law statute (“DGCL”) does not define the term “officer” of a corporation.10
Another Delaware statute, Section 3114(b) of the Courts and Judicial
5

Id. at 703.
Id.
7 Id. at 714.
8 Id. at 708–09 (citations omitted).
9 See Goldman v. Shahmoon, 208 A.2d 492, 494 (1965) (“It is clear that the terms officers and agents
are by no means interchangeable. Officers as such are the corporation. An agent is an employee.”); see
generally GARY LOCKWOOD, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND
INSURANCE § 1:44 (2d ed. 2014).
10 See LOCKWOOD, supra note 9, at § 1:44.
6
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Procedure Code,11 provides that, for purposes of that Section (which imposes
constructive consent to service of process obligations on officers of Delaware
corporations), the word “officer” means, in relevant part, an officer of the
corporation who is the president, chief executive officer, chief operating
officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief
accounting officer of the corporation.12 As a basis for defining an officer for
purposes of applying fiduciary duty equivalency, this statutory approach has
the weakness of emphasizing the title of the employee rather than the
substance of his or her duties. As an example, an employee of one corporation
may have a job title that is not one of the “officer” titles listed in the statute
while, in substance, her duties may be the same as those of an employee of a
second corporation whose job title is so listed in the statute.13 It is clearly not
appropriate for the employee of the second corporation to be subject to
fiduciary duty equivalency, whereas the employee of the first corporation is
not.
The judicial approach to defining a corporate officer appears to endorse the
view that an employee that is performing services for a corporation is an
officer of the corporation if there is an office corresponding to his or her duties
provided for in the charter or bylaws of the corporation.14 This approach, while
having the attraction of focusing on the substance of the employee’s role rather
than necessarily the employee’s title, does have limitations as a rule of
universal application for purposes of applying fiduciary duty equivalency. For
example, each of two corporations may have an employee performing certain
duties. The bylaws of the first corporation expressly designates those duties to
the holder of a titled office of the corporation; whereas the second
corporation’s charter and bylaws make no such designation. Here, again, it
would not be an appropriate outcome, simply because of the different
formulations of their constitutive documents, for the first corporation’s
employee to be subject to fiduciary duty equivalency while the second
corporation’s employee is not.

11

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (West 2009).
Id. at §3114(b)(1).
13 See generally id. (providing that an officer may be someone who “has, by written agreement with the
corporation, consented to be identified as an officer for purposes of this section.”).
14 See Shahmoon, 208 A.2d at 494.
12
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The Delaware case law and statutes do not offer any universal definition of
the term “officer” for purposes of fiduciary duty equivalency.15 This should be
addressed by the Delaware courts or legislature. As one academic puts it “[i]f
Delaware courts decide to impose a form of officer liability, it is incumbent on
the courts to specify precisely which officers are at risk for personal liability,
and how they can be identified”16 and “[t]here are numerous practical
difficulties with this kind of uncertainty . . . [t]he most important is that an
officer would not know whether she was an officer for liability purposes until a
court made that determination[;] [c]onsidering the potential dysfunction
wrought by the uncertainty, this sort of arrangement is untenable in the real
world of running a business.”17
A solution for defining which employees of a corporation are “officers” for
purposes of fiduciary duty equivalency might be some combination of the
statutory and case-law approaches discussed above. Under this proposal, the
Delaware courts or legislature would establish a two-pronged definition of
“officer” as meaning either (i) any of the employees of a corporation holding
certain types of job titles, or (ii) any employee, regardless of title, whose duties
are those customarily performed by a person holding any of those job titles. A
good example of this approach may be found in Rule 16a-1(f) under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:
The term ‘‘officer’’ shall mean an issuer’s president, principal
financial officer, principal accounting officer (or, if there is no such
accounting officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in
charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as
sales, administration or finance), any other officer who performs a
policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar
18
policy-making functions for the issuer.

C. Should Directors and Officers Have Identical “Caremark Duties?”
In accordance with one branch of the fiduciary duties of directors (namely,
the duty of loyalty), directors have an oversight responsibility with respect to
the corporation’s functioning within the law and its business performance.19 In
1996, the Delaware Court of Chancery, in Caremark International Inc.
15

See generally id. (stating that “officers . . .are the corporation” and failing to elaborate on a further
definition); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (West 2009).
16 Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315, 335 (2011).
17 Id.
18 17 C.F.R. § 240 16a–1(f) (2011).
19 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Derivative Litigation, held that “a director’s obligation includes a duty to
attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting
system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render directors liable for
losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”20 Ten years
later, in Stone v. Ritter,21 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Caremark
criterion for director oversight liability. In Stone, the court stated “[w]e hold
that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director
oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.”22
It is not immediately apparent that directors’ Caremark “duty of
attention”23 can or should apply in an identical manner to officers of a
corporation.24 A central issue in Caremark was whether the corporation’s
directors exercised adequate monitoring and oversight to ensure that the
corporation’s officers and employees complied with federal law.25 Imposing
this monitoring oversight responsibility on officers would seem to disturb the
familiar allocation of corporate roles under traditional corporate and legal
theory that directors oversee and officers execute.26 Giving officers such a
“double duty” of actively executing day-to-day operational tasks while

20

Id. at 970.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006).
22 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960.
23 See id. at 968 (“Where a director in fact exercises a good faith effort to be informed and to exercise
appropriate judgment, he or she should be deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention.”).
24 In In re World Health Alts., Inc. v. Miller 385 B.R. 576, 591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008), a bankruptcy
trustee in a case involving fraudulent activities by the CEO sued the debtor company’s general counsel for,
among other things, failing to fulfill his Caremark duty to implement a sufficient compliance monitoring
system. The defendant, in seeking to dismiss the claim, argued “that Delaware law does not support the breach
of fiduciary duty claims against officers because the Caremark line of cases all addressed the fiduciary duties
of directors, not officers.” Id. While agreeing “that all of the cases relied upon by the Trustee involved
directors’ conduct, not officers” the court nonetheless rejected this defense, stating, among other things, that
“the Caremark decision itself suggests that the same test would be applicable to officers.” Id. at 591–92.
25 Id. at 963.
26 See MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONOBACH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK § 1:1
(2015–2016 ed.) (“Shareholders elect the members of the board of directors to oversee their investments. The
board of directors, in turn, appoints corporate officers who execute board-approved policies.”).
21
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fulfilling an oversight responsibility is somewhat like having the pitcher in a
baseball game function simultaneously as the umpire.27
Since the Stone decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery has implied that
directors, particularly outside directors (i.e., those who are not also employees
of the corporation), are best suited to shoulder the oversight and monitoring
duties contemplated under the liability principles developed by Caremark and
its progeny.28 In In re Lear Corporation Shareholder Litigation, Vice
Chancellor Strine stated:
The line of cases running from Graham v. Allis-Chalmers to
Caremark to Guttman to Stone v. Ritter dealt in large measure with
what is arguably the hardest question in corporation law: what is the
standard of liability to apply to independent directors with no motive
to injure the corporation when they are accused of indolence in
monitoring the corporation’s compliance with its legal
responsibilities? The question is difficult for many reasons, including
the reality that even the most diligent board cannot guarantee that an
entire organization will always comply with the law. But it must be
answered because one of the central justifications for the use of
independent directors is that they are well positioned to oversee
management, particularly by monitoring the processes used by the
corporation to accurately account for its financial affairs and comply
29
with applicable laws.

If, as seems to be implied by Lear, outside directors and insider directors may
have different monitoring and oversight responsibilities because of their
different corporate roles, then, a fortiori, those responsibilities should differ as
between directors and officers. More fundamentally, spreading the Caremark
oversight function coextensively among directors and officers might blur and
dilute lines of responsibility and confuse the assignation of correlative liability.
If the implementation and oversight of an effective corporate information and
reporting system is a joint and coextensive obligation of the directors and
officers, this could arguably produce the scenario where all directors and
officers are collectively, but not any single one is, liable for any actionable
failure of such implementation and oversight.
27 As a practical matter, requiring each and every officer of a large corporation to be bound by broad
oversight and monitoring responsibilities appears far less feasible and practicable than having such a
requirement with respect to each and every director, especially an independent director, of the same
corporation. See id. (“Managers acting under the oversight of those officers oversee the day-to-day activities of
the corporation.”).
28 See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 653 (Del. Ch. 2008).
29 Id.
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D. Should the Business Judgment Rule Protect Officers as it Does to
Directors?
An important point not explicitly addressed by Gantler relates to the
application of the business judgment rule to corporate officers. The business
judgment rule has been described by the Delaware Supreme Court as follows:
Our law presumes that “in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.” Those presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows
that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or
acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the burden then shifts to the
director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or
30
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.

In other words, unless a plaintiff succeeds in rebutting the rule, the court will
not substitute its views for those of the board directors if the board’s decision
can be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”31 As a consequence of the
business judgment rule, it has been held that, under Delaware law, only
conduct amounting to “gross negligence,” as opposed to mere ordinary
negligence or less culpable behavior, would result in personal liability for a
director for the breach of the duty of care.32
The notion of extending the business judgment rule to the conduct of
officers to the same extent as applicable to directors has been questioned and
openly challenged as not justified by either legal precedent or policy grounds.33
As one commentator put it four years before the Gantler decision:
Case law support for extending broad business judgment rule
protection to officers is far weaker than commentators and courts
acknowledge or appreciate. The policy case, likewise, fails to stand

30

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.65 (Del. 2000).
32 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[O]ur analysis satisfies us that under the business
judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”); Citigroup Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[D]irector action is analyzed under the business
judgment rule, which prevents judicial second guessing of the decision if the directors employed a rational
process and considered all material information reasonably available—a standard measured by concepts of
gross negligence.”).
33 Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440
(2005).
31
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up, at least based on the standard rationales underlying the rule’s
34
application to directors.

Academic viewpoints are far from united regarding whether the business
judgment rule should protect the actions of corporate officers.35 One view is
that officers should simply be held to the usual fiduciary standard of due care
without any application of the business judgment rule.36 One commentator
states it this way: “Because the manager’s role is supposed to be ministerial
rather than policy setting, it would seem that decisions by officers would not
normally get the full protection of the business judgment rule.”37 Echoing this,
another commentator states that “the business judgment rule—a cornerstone
concept in corporate law—does not and should not be extended to corporate
officers in the same broad manner in which it is applied to directors” arguing
that sensible policy requires “that corporate officers—like other agents—face
potential liability for damages caused by breaching the duty of ordinary care
they owe the corporation.”38
An alternative view is that the business judgment rule is and should be
applied to breach of fiduciary duty claims against corporate officers in the
same way as it applies to such claims against corporate directors.39 As one
commentator puts it: “[W]e ultimately and respectfully disagree with . . . [the]
urging that the business judgment rule should not extend to non-director
officers . . . [w]e continue to believe that the policy rationales underlying the
development and application of the business judgment rule to corporate

34 Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 469
(2005); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers about Fiduciary
Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 666 (2007) (“Delaware law contains abundant dicta on, but has never
squarely addressed, the issue of whether officers are subject to the same fiduciary duties as directors. Nor has
Delaware addressed the related and pivotal question of whether officer conduct should be judicially reviewed
under the deferential business judgment rule standard.”).
35 Across U.S. jurisdictions, judicial viewpoints are also uneven on this point, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Gantler: Officers, Agents, and Directors, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE (Aug. 4, 2009, 07:19 AM),
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/08/gantler-officers-agents-and-directors.html
(“Judicial precedents are divided, however. [Compare Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 n.13 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that the business judgment rule “generally applies to decisions of executive officers as well as those
of directors”); FDIC v. Stahl, 854 F. Supp. 1565, 1570 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that the rule “applies
equally to both officers and directors”) with Platt v. Richardson, 1989 WL 159584 at *2 (M.D. Pa. 1989)
(holding that the rule “applies only to directors of a corporation and not to officers.”). . . .]”).
36 Id.
37 Lael Daniel Weinberger, The Business Judgment Rule and Sphere Sovereignty, 27 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 279, 315 (2010).
38 Lyman P.Q. Johnson, supra note 33, at 469.
39 See id. at 441–42.
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directors similarly justify application of the rule to non-director officers, at
least with respect to their exercise of discretionary delegated authority.”40
Whether and to what extent the business judgment rule should be applied to
the conduct of corporate officers remains an open point yet to be resolved by
the Delaware courts. The absence of that resolution constitutes a gaping fissure
in the doctrine of fiduciary duty equivalency.
E. Should Statutory Exculpation be Coextensively Available to Corporate
Officers and Directors?
DGCL § 102(b)(7) provides that, subject to certain exceptions (such as in
the case of breaches of the duty of loyalty or conduct not in good faith or
involving intentional misconduct), a corporation’s certificate of incorporation
may contain a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach
of fiduciary duty as a director.41 In Gantler, the Delaware Supreme Court
acknowledged that DGCL § 102(b)(7) does not similarly permit exculpation of
corporate officers from liability for breaches of their fiduciary duties.42
Accordingly, although, by virtue of Gantler, Delaware corporate officers
and directors share identical fiduciary duties, the liability consequences of an
identical breach of fiduciary duty by a corporation’s director, on the one hand,
and one of its officers, on the other hand, could be quite dissimilar.43 If the
corporation has adopted a provision in its certificate of incorporation
exculpating its directors with respect to breaches of duty of care to the extent
permitted by DGCL § 102(b)(7), the officer could face monetary liability to the
corporation and its stockholders for such a breach while the director would
face no such liability for an identical breach.44 Gantler did not articulate any
policy justification or other rationale for this disparate statutory treatment
between directors and corporate officers.45 Nor has any other Delaware case
done so.46 Some commentators have argued that, if corporate officers are to
have “identical” fiduciary duties as directors, then the officers should be
40 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment
Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005).
41 DGCL § 102(b)(7).
42 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709 n.37.
43 Id. at 709 n. 36
44 DGCL § 102(b)(7).
45 See generally Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d. 695 (Del. 2009).
46 See id. at 708.
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entitled to identical statutory exculpation rights under DGCL § 102(b)(7).47
Prior to Gantler, there were calls made on the Delaware legislature to include
corporate officers within the protection of DGCL § 102(b)(7).48 In the wake of
Gantler, one can expect these calls to persist.
F. Should Officers, as Employees, be Fiduciaries to the Same Extent as the
Directors Charged with Overseeing Them?
A potential criticism of the Gantler decision is that corporate officers, as
employees of a corporation who must answer to their corporation’s directors,
should not be viewed as fiduciaries of equal order as those very same directors.
This proposition, put more starkly, states that if corporate officers are “merely”
employees of the corporation,49 then they should not be categorized as
fiduciaries of the same order as directors.50 An elaboration on this proposition
follows.
47 Stephen P. Lamb & Joseph Christensen, Duty Follows Function: Two Approaches to Curing the
Mismatch Between the Fiduciary Duties and Potential Personal Liability of Corporate Officers, 26 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 45, 46 (2012) (stating that although the § 102(b)(7) exculpation amendment
“was perhaps the most important public policy contribution the Delaware legislature has made to corporate law
apart from adopting the revised General Corporation Law,” its contribution is “incomplete” because “the
Delaware Supreme Court held that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors . . . but cannot be
exculpated for the same class of fiduciary breaches as directors.”); Meghan Glaspy, Delaware’s Gantler
Decision: A Solution to Corporate Corruption?, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 307 (2014) (“Because
officers and directors have the same fiduciary duties, as held in Gantler, they, too, should have equal liability
resulting from those duties”); see also Andrew D. Appleby & Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s Company:
Stone v. Ritter and the Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary Duty “Triad”, 62 ARK. L.
REV. 431, 469 (2009) (stating that “[w]hile Gantler leaves officers extremely vulnerable to Van Gorkom-like
liability, the current ‘anti-executive social-political climate’ may preclude the courts or legislature from
extending officers any section 102(b)(7) protection”); see also Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom:
Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection,
45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 307 (2006) (arguing that officers should be allowed statutory exculpation because
“the same reasoning that supports protecting directors also applies to officers.”).
48 See, e.g., Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and Exculpatory ClausesA Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 331 (2006) (“One way
to eliminate the uncertainty over how courts will resolve the officer liability issues would be to amend the
exculpatory provisions to provide officers statutory protection from personal liability.”).
49 Gantler and other Delaware decisions provide scant guidance as to whether corporate officers are
solely employees or something further. See Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 65 BUS. LAW.
193, 211 (2009) (“While acknowledging a distinction between officers and mere agents and employees, the
Delaware courts have not clearly identified the dividing line.”).
50 Judicial statements implying some support for this view include the following: “[U]nder Delaware law,
an employer and employee, simply by virtue of their present or contemplated future employment relationship,
[do] not stand in a fiduciary relationship to one another with respect to agreements governing such
relationship.” Toner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 695, 704–05 n.10 (D. Del. 1993); see also Meyer
Ventures, Inc. v. Barnak, No. 11502, 1990 WL 172648 at *6 n.5 (“Even the existence of an employment
agreement is not dispositive as to whether or not there was a fiduciary relationship . . . plaintiff has not
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A director of a corporation is typically elected by the corporation’s
stockholders; the corporate officers are employees of the corporation and
typically serve at the pleasure of the board of directors.51 Given this hierarchy,
it might seem more logical and justifiable for directors, as the elected overseers
(and not corporate officers, as the overseen employees), to owe fiduciary duties
to the corporation and its stockholders. In other words, one might see a
mismatch between corporate officers owing to the corporation and its
shareholders fiduciary duties that are identical to those duties owed by
directors, while at the same time being subject to plenary direction and control
of the board of directors.52 As one commentator explains:
The directors control the specificity of the delegation and the level of
discretion involved which determines liability for breach. The board
of directors delegates the authority and discretion to the officers, so it
seems unfair for them to be insulated and let off the hook while
officers are exposed to liability for carrying out the delegation.
Insulation of directors and imposition of liability solely on the
officers would frustrate corporate governance because officers would
be incentivized to leave more decisions to the board of directors and
would take fewer of the risks that are necessary for a company to
grow . . . . While it is true officers are often more involved on a daytoday basis with the corporation, the operations of the corporation are
53
ultimately controlled by the directors, not the officers.

In sum, Gantler requires us to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent precepts
that (1) under Delaware law, the employer-employee relationship is not
fiduciary in itself,54 and (2) by virtue of Gantler, all corporate officers, a genus
of employee, are fiduciaries of the same order as directors.55

advanced the existence of a fiduciary relationship as a basis for granting relief, and since it is a question of
fact, it is inappropriate for this court to assume, sua sponte, on a motion for summary judgment that a fiduciary
relationship, in fact, existed.”).
51 See The Basics of Corporate Governance, HUTCHISON PLLC (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.hutchlaw.
com/library/the-basics-of-corporate-governance.
52 See Meghan Glaspy, Delaware’s Gantler Decision: A Solution to Corporate Corruption?, 12 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 289, 307–08 (2014).
53 Id.
54 Meyer Ventures, 1990 WL 172648, at *4 n.5 (“The employee-employer relationship is not fiduciary in
itself.”) (citations omitted).
55 See Toner, 829 F. Supp. 695 at 704 n.10.
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CONCLUSION
The Gantler decision was unequivocal in its pronouncement that corporate
officers and directors are subject to identical fiduciary duties.56 However, the
decision was scant on detail regarding the practical effect of applying fiduciary
duty equivalency to corporate officers. As discussed above, several key issues
regarding the duties and liabilities of corporate officers remain open for
resolution by Delaware’s courts. If the courts determine to resolve these
questions, the task will not be without guiding stars; they will find at their
disposal a robust body of academic discussion regarding these important, but
judicially overlooked, corporate governance issues.

56

Gantler, 965 A.2d 695 at 708–09.

